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FEHÉR M. ISTVÁN 
Hermeneutic philosophy has come to be a major philosophi- 
cal trend of the 20th century philosophy. It has transformed the 
traditional ways of approaching philosophical problems, of look- 
ing upon and dealing with them indeed, it modified to a great 
extent our understanding of philosophy itself.: “To speak of a 
revolution in the history of thought is perhaps too grand,” an 
interpreter wrote recently, “but certainly there has been a general 
movement that can be called the ’hermeneutic turn’.”1 
The emergence of contemporary hermeneutic philosophy, 
which may also be called the hermeneutic turn of philosophy, is 
largely due to the philosophical work of Martin Heidegger. Hei- 
degger on his part performed a kind of hermeneutic turn himself 
on his path of thinking. It is this twofold theme, contemporary 
hermeneutics or the hermeneutic turn of contemporary philoso- 
phy on the one hand, and Heidegger’s hermeneutic turn at the 
other, that I wish to discuss in what follows. 
In the first part of my paper I will sum up some of the major 
claims of contemporary hermeneutics, then I will proceed to 
present in some detail what I call specifically Heidegger’s herme- 
neutic turn. The presentation of Heidegger’s hermeneutic turn 
1 David C. Hoy: “Heidegger and the Hermeneutic Turn,” in: The Cambrid- 
ge Companion to Heidegger, ed. Ch. Guignon (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. 
Press, 1993), p. 170. 
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will not be confined to something such as his contribution to XXth 
century or contemporary hermeneutics, but will be treated on its 
own. I propose to show some of the reasons why Heidegger is 
often claimed to have given hermeneutics an ontological dimen- 
sion or ontological interpretation – and, in particular, how in 
Heidegger’s ontological radicalization of hermeneutics the influ- 
ence of Dilthey and Husserl played a fundamental role. 
1. The Emergence of Contemporary Hermeneutics 
The problem of the interpretation of texts handed down by 
the tradition is about as old as philosophy itself. In its traditional 
sense, hermeneutics has been understood as the theory of rules 
which govern the interpretation of texts, and which should permit 
us to establish their possibly objective meaning. Due to a number 
of circumstances, such as the cultural crisis of our century, the 
expansion of technology and world civilization, the loss of sense 
of classical humanistic tradition, etc., the problems of interpreta- 
tion have come to assume an ever more important role in recent 
philosophy. The hermeneutic problematic has emerged as a 
central topic, and has been given autonomous philosophical 
elaboration, in the thought of at least two of the most influential 
philosophers of our century: Heidegger and Gadamer. The her- 
meneutic turn of philosophy which they carried out implies that 
interpretation is no more seen as an auxiliary discipline of human 
sciences as the rules of interpretation of classical texts. Rather, it 
emerges as an autonomous philosophical stance insofar as man 
is viewed in all kinds of his everyday activities not only in han- 
dling classical texts pertaining to the compartment of human 
sciences as an interpreting animal. In assessing the full import 
and the radicality of this turn, we have reason to speak about an 
overall hermeneutic reconception of philosophy. The radicality 
of this change would however be wholly misunderstood and to a 
considerable extent underestimated if we conceived of it in terms 
of a change whereby our description of just one being among 
many others had been changed, while that of the others had 
remained basically the same. Rather what this change implies is 
that all our habitual conceptual strategies and linguistic devices 
together with the underlying comportment and worldview, are to 
undergo an overall reconsideration and reconception one often 
called destruction or deconstruction. 
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The hermeneutic turn of philosophy implies further far more 
than the mere fact that philosophical thinking has now come to 
center its reflection upon the hermeneutic tradition – the texts of 
authors who have exposed, in various ages and places, various 
doctrines and conceptions of interpretation. What it implies is, 
rather that the problem of interpretation is looked upon as a 
philosophical problem sui generis, whereby philosophy itself 
gains a kind of hermeneutical self-awareness and undergoes a 
deep transformation. Philosophy, thus transformed hermeneuti- 
cally, re-defines its relation to the classical (hermeneutical) tradi- 
tion, no less than to the other disciplines. The hermeneutical 
reflection has nowadays become, in a very broad sense, a kind of 
medium, or element, of philosophy – an analytical device, as it 
were – which has a diffuse presence permeating the most various 
branches and fields of philosophical activity. 
The general philosophical significance of hermeneutics lies in 
the fact that philosophy has been handed down in texts; be it 
ontology, epistemology, ethics, etc., wherever we look we have 
to do with texts which require interpreting, appropriating, and 
handing over. But even refutation and criticism are not productive 
unless based upon preliminary understanding of what the texts to 
be refuted or criticized have to say. The relevance hermeneutics 
has for the sciences is given, second, by the fact that hermeneuti- 
cal thinking illuminates some wider horizon of life into which the 
sciences themselves as particular forms of socio-historical human 
activity are embedded. Last but not least, hermeneutics has also 
some considerable political relevance: hermeneutic openness, as 
an attitude essential to this thinking, may help educate and bring 
up young people to be critical and self-critical citizens, able to 
understand and respect alien conceptions and cultures. In a plu- 
ralistic universe, a “logic of questioning and answering” (Gada- 
mer) becomes particularly important in helping us work out a 
mutual understanding (Verständigung). Understanding a text is 
on a hermeneutical view, understanding it together with its truth 
claims, on the one hand, and letting the text challenge our own 
criteria of judging it on the other. The main hermeneutic defi- 
ciency in interpreting philosophical texts lies, on a Gadamerian 
view, not so much in applying false or bizarre criteria, but, rather, 
in making the criteria of our confrontation with the text inacces- 
sible to critical scrutiny. 
In order to assess the full import and the radicality of this turn, 
which amounts to an overall reconception of philosophy, we are 
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to go back to its sources, i.e. to reconstruct the problem situation 
of German philosophy at the turn of the century. 
2. Heidegger’s Hermeneutic Turn: Hermeneutics and 
the Being-question 
In its attempt to challenge the positivistic idea of unified sci- 
ence as well as to defend the autonomy of the human studies, 
epistemologically oriented German philosophy had come to dis- 
tinguish between two autonomous kinds of scientific knowledge 
or cognition: the one providing knowledge of general laws and 
characteristic of the natural sciences, the other making us ac- 
quainted with singular events and proper to the kind of knowl- 
edge we have in human sciences [Geisteswissenschaften]. 
These two forms of knowledge were sometimes also distin- 
guished terminologically as explanation [Erklärung] and under- 
standing [Verstehen]. Dilthey defined understanding as “the pro- 
cess by which we know some inner content from signs received 
by the senses from outside”;2 interpretation was for him “the 
artistic [arts-like] understanding of life manifestations objectified in 
written form.”3 He conceived hermeneutics as “the methodology 
of the understanding of recorded expressions”.4 
Implicit in the epistemological dualism of explanation and un- 
derstanding is a latent ontological distinction between nature and 
spirit. With regard to nature our knowledge is explanation, con- 
cerning consciousness it is understanding. „We explain nature, 
and we understand spirit,” says Dilthey.5 That is the reason also 
why Dilthey finds something like the „understanding of nature” 
an improper or just approximate or „metaphorical” expression.6 
For Heidegger hermeneutics is no more wissenschafts- 
theoretisch-oriented (or validity-oriented). This follows from his 
2 „Vorgang, in welchem wir aus Zeichen, die von außen sinnlich gegeben 
sind, ein Inneres erkennen.” (W. Dilthey, „Die Entstehung der Hermeneutik,” in: 
Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 5, p. 318). 
3 „Das kunstmäßige Verstehen von schriftlich fixierten Lebensäußerungen” 
(ibid., p. 332). 
4 Ibid., p. 332. 
5 „Die Natur erklaren wir, das Seelenleben verstehen wir” (Dilthey, „Ideen 
über eine beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie,” Gesammelte 
Schriften, vol. 5, p. 144). 
6 „Verstehen der Natur – interpretatio naturae – [...] ein bildlicher Ausdruck.” 
(„Die Entstehung der Hermeneutik,” p. 318). 
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basic tendency to challenge the priority of epistemology and 
theory of science in philosophy, and to reaffirm the primacy of 
ontology. One of his main arguments is that scientific cognition is 
preceded by and derived from, man’s Being-in-the-world. In the 
elaboration of his philosophical stance, Heidegger transformed 
phenomenology in an ontological way which is very much the 
case with what he did with regard to hermeneutics itself. Like 
phenomenology, hermeneutics was also given an ontological 
dimension that it formerly did not have. 
In accordance with this reconception of philosophy, Heideg- 
ger no longer views understanding and interpretation as just re- 
gional concepts confined to particular domains to the methodol- 
ogy of the human sciences. Rather he views man in all the 
modes of his everyday activities as an interpreting animal. This 
holds also with regard to the kind of activity we call philosophical 
research, i.e., questioning. Insofar as the human being is an inter- 
preting animal it interprets being as well, and Heidegger formu- 
lates his being-question specifically in terms of a question con- 
cerning the meaning (Sinn) of being. As Ricoeur puts it: “The 
usage of interpretation in the historico-hermeneutic sciences is 
only the anchoring point for a universal concept of interpret- 
ation.”7 
Understanding is on this view no more a way of knowing 
proper to the human studies, in contradistinction to explanation 
as the way of knowledge characteristic of the natural sciences. It 
is rather a way of being of the being called human. Humans are 
understanding, so to speak all along. What they understand are 
not matters of fact out there in the world but the way they find 
themselves in the world involved in it and coping with it. 
With regard to hermeneutics this reconception of philosophy 
implies furthermore that interpretation does not presuppose “re- 
corded expressions,” as with Dilthey,8 but vice versa: making 
7 P. Ricceur, “Phenomenology and Hermeneutics,” in Hermeneutics and 
the Human Sciences, ed. John B. Thompson (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1981), p. 107. See also Richard E. Palmer, Hermeneutics. 
Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer, 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969), p. 130: “Hermeneutics as 
methodology of interpretation for the humanities is a derivative form resting on 
and growing out of the primary ontological function of interpreting. It is a 
regional ontology which must be based on the more fundamental ontology.” 
8 Dilthey construed hermeneutics as being “the methodology of the 
understanding of recorded expressions” („Die Entstehung der Hermeneutik,” p. 
332). For a more detailed reconstruction, see Rudolf A. Makkreel, Dilthey: 
Philosopher of the Human Studies, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princeton University 
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assertions whatsoever presupposes preliminary interpretation. 
Assertion is for Heidegger a derivative mode of understanding.9 
A hammer e.g. is for all above encountered as a tool for pound- 
ing nails into the wall; and in this encounter it has always already 
been preliminarily understood or interpreted as such. If the 
hammer proves to be too heavy “[i]nterpretation is carried out 
primordially not in a theoretical statement but in an action [...] –  
laying aside the unsuitable tool, or exchanging it, ‘without 
wasting a word’”.10 To put it bluntly: for Heidegger, in order to 
do interpreting one need not speak or make assertions, but in 
order to speak one must have done interpreting. 
Brought up in the scholastic tradition but extremely respon- 
sive to contemporary logical-epistemological ways of philoso- 
phizing represented by neo-Kantianism and phenomenology, 
Heidegger had as early as his doctoral dissertation and his habili- 
tation work hoped to pose the Being question. Studying modern 
logical or epistemological theories in order to use them for meta- 
physical purposes meant for Heidegger recognizing the fact that 
such theories are not exempt from metaphysical presuppositions. 
Nor, inversely can metaphysical or ontological theories be ex- 
empt from logical or epistemological presuppositions; that is, 
from more or less explicit assumptions concerning human think- 
ing or knowing – in short from a theory of man as a rational ani- 
mal. If you pose the question of Being you already set a certain 
logic and conceptuality into motion every time; and these repose 
upon a certain attitude of the knowing subject. One of Heideg- 
ger’s early insights is that the tradition from Aristotle onward had 
gained its access to Being from within the conceptual horizon 
Press, 1992), pp. 258f., and, for Dilthey’s revisiting his standpoint with regard to 
the distinction of natural and human sciences reconstructed from recently edited 
manuscripts, the Afterword to the Second Edition (pp. 423ff.). On the difference 
between Dilthey’s and Heidegger’s understanding of hermeneutics, see Rudolf A. 
Makkreel, “The Genesis of Heidegge’s Phenomenological Hermeneutics and 
the Rediscovered ‘Aristotle Introduction’ of 1922,” in Man and World 23 
(1990), pp. 310ff. 
9 See Heidegger BT, § 33. (Bibliographical Remark: Heidegger’s works will 
be cited with abbreviations. The abbreviations for the Gesamtausgabe volumes 
take the form of the letters GA followed by volume number, colon, and page 
numbers. Full bibliographical data are provided at the end of the paper. If there 
are references to both the original German text and the corresponding English 
translation the German pagination and the English pagination are separated by a 
slash. For example: “SZ 10/30,” “GA 20: 417/301f.,” the number before the 
slash indicating the German edition, the one after the slash the English edition. 
Other abbreviations: WS = Wintersemester; SS = Sommersemester.) 
10 Heidegger SZ, 157/200. 
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provided by the theoretical attitude, giving thereby rise to theories 
of Being in terms of objective presence. That this comportment 
was far from being the original mode of being of human exis- 
tence was, however, an insight which required the prior unifica- 
tion of the Husserlian perspective of philosophy as a strict sci- 
ence with the tradition of existential and life philosophy. It was in 
the course of this unification that Heidegger’s basic hermeneutic 
perspective was born. 
Indeed what we call hermeneutic philosophy or the herme- 
neutic turn of 20th century philosophy today, relies for its emer- 
gence upon the work of Martin Heidegger and more specifically 
upon the turn which Heidegger himself carried out after World 
War I. when he came to adopt the specific philosophical perspec- 
tive which was to remain characteristically or distinctively his own 
for the whole path of his thinking. 
Although Heidegger’s student and academic writings bear 
witness to a solid familiarity with the major philosophical trends 
of the day and they display well-argued preferences, in no case 
can they be considered to be the works of an autonomous 
thinker. It was only after the war that Heidegger was to find his 
own voice and to begin going his own way towards Being and 
Time. Heidegger’s turn following World War One is the turn 
through which Heidegger, a talented student of Husserl, Rickert, 
Dilthey or others, became Heidegger himself, i.e., the thinker we 
know and appreciate today, using a distinct language and con- 
ceptuality, one all his own. Thus it is important to outline briefly 
the main lines of Heidegger’s rethinking and development of his 
position into a new and original outlook. 
We should bear in mind that it is somehow the prerogative or 
perhaps the fate of every great and original philosopher, if he is 
really such, to rethink and redefine the concept of philosophy 
itself. Small wonder then that Heidegger, when he set out on his 
own, repeatedly reflected upon philosophy itself, re-examining its 
very concept and meaning.11 Rethinking and redefining the con- 
cept of philosophy itself, what philosophy really is, if it is to be 
radical enough, means undertaking an intense confrontation with 
the leading philosophical tendencies of the day, no less than with 
11 In his transcript of the WS 1919–20 course „Grundprobleme der 
Phanomenologie,” F. J. Brecht noted on the „Ursprungsgebiet” of philosophy 
the following: „Das Schicksal der Philosophie! Tendenz in der Geschichte der 
Philosophie: immer neu anfangen, um es zu erreichen” (Oct. 14, 1919). 
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the philosophical tradition in general. This is exactly what Hei- 
degger did. 
Heidegger’s devastating critique of contemporary trends of 
philosophizing employed the strategy of taking them seriously, 
taking them at their word, as it were, and then uncovering the 
extent to which they fail to do justice to their own claims. His 
critique had basically the following directions. Epistemologically 
oriented scientific philosophy was criticized for not being scien- 
tific enough, life philosophy was accused of failing to grasp life 
itself, existential philosophy was charged with not seizing upon 
existence, historicism was called to account for losing sight of 
nothing less than history itself, and, last but not least, phenome- 
nology was challenged for not being phenomenological enough- 
indeed, for being “unphenomenological.” 
An overall attempt at appropriation and reappropriation, an 
effort to come to terms with the significant tendencies of con- 
temporary philosophy – inclusive of the philosophical tradition in 
general – should however sooner or later display obvious prefer- 
ences which somehow constitute the basis and criteria for the 
confrontation, the reappropriation and the development of a 
new perspective. Schematically speaking, Heidegger’s prefer- 
ences lay clearly with Dilthey’s life-philosophy, i.e., the perspec- 
tive centering around the conviction that philosophy’s ownmost 
object is life or historical life, on the one hand, and with Husserl’s 
phenomenology that called for a return to the things themselves, 
on the other. His main operation consisted in reciprocally medi- 
ating between the two, or fusing the one with the other, and that 
is how his basic hermeneutic perspective was developed. 
Husserl’s password sounded: Back to the things themselves, 
but the thing properly so-called was for him consciusness with its 
intentional acts. The thing, by contrast, came to assume an en- 
tirely different character for Heidegger. Given his sense for 
Dilthey, the thing was to be for him life itself in its originality, that 
is, as it is lived in everyday, pre-scientific life, and as it expresses 
itself in its own language. Husserl insisted on presuppositionless 
assumption as well as description of the given over against all 
kinds of theoretical construction, and Heidegger enthusiastically 
took over this insight from Husserl and turned it against him as 
well as Dilthey, who was claimed to describe life from a theoreti- 
cally falsified perspective. 
Heidegger’s appropriation of the problematic of factual- 
historical life was to serve as a starting point for the renewal of 
the Being question, that is, a renewal of systematic or scientific 
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philosophy-not just as a turning away from it, as has been the 
case with so many anti-metaphysical thinkers in the history of 
philosophy. The posing and working out of the Being question 
pertains to what Heidegger calls fundamental ontology. The latter 
becomes embedded in, and begins with, a thematization of the 
being of the subject – a discipline named existential analytic, which 
becomes rooted in the hermeneutics of human being. 
One of Heidegger’s earliest insights is that contemporary 
philosophy’s descriptions of everyday life, the environing world, 
etc. stem from, and are rooted in, theoretical comportment and 
conceptuality. They therefore fail to do justice to factical life – its 
comportment and the language it speaks – precisely insofar as the 
theoretical attitude is a derivative mode of factical life. In 1921– 
22 Heidegger urges that the meaning of Descartes’ “I am” should 
be investigated more deeply, and warns against allowing tradi- 
tional views of the “I” to infiltrate surreptitiously. If life is to be 
brought to self-showing, then it is the “am” rather than the “I” 
which must be stressed.12 In the third part of the course Heideg- 
ger provides the first detailed analysis of what will be called 
“hermeneutics of facticity” in 1923, and “existential analytic” in 
Being and Time – a description put under the heading of “factical 
life.” 
As part of the rethinking of the methodological devices of 
phenomenology and contemporary philosophy, we find sketches 
and outlines of a theory of understanding with its characteristic 
pre-structure.13 A result of this reconsideration is the exposition 
of what Heidegger calls “formal indication,” which is taken to be 
the method proper of philosophy or phenomenology.14 Gener- 
ally speaking, it is due to Heidegger’s search for proper meth- 
odological devices for an adequate conceptual expression of “fac- 
tical life” that the hermeneutic problematic emerges in the post- 
war lecture courses. Theoretically (and ahistorically) neutral 
knowledge is opposed to, and gives way to, existentially (and 
historically) involved understanding (or pre-understanding) and 
interpreting – whereby knowledge becomes at best a subdivision of 
understanding. All these efforts are in the service of seizing “life.” 
12 GA 61: 173ff.; for later, see, e.g., SZ 46/71, 211/254. 
13 See GA 56/57: 116f.; GA 61: 41ff., 59; GA 9: 9, 32, 38f.; GA 63: 79f.; 
for later, see GA 20: 416/300. 
14 GA 9: 9f., 29; GA 61: 20, 32ff., 60, 66f., 113, 116, 134, 141, 175; GA 
21: 410; GA 29/30: 425ff. 
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The main character of the latter is concern (Sorge) rather than 
knowledge.15 
It is in his effort to gain a new access to life, as well as to re- 
ject the theoretical conceptuality and comportment proper to 
transcendental philosophy, that Heidegger formulates his herme- 
neutic concepts and formal indication, and so comes to the 
elaboration of a hermeneutics of facticity. “Facticity” is a term 
adopted to substitute for the vague and ambiguous concept of life 
employed by life-philosophy, as well as for that of “existence” 
employed by Jaspers and Kierkegaard. “Hermeneutics,” “herme- 
neutical,” have the meaning of rival concepts to “theory”, “theo- 
retical,” understood in terms of “theoretically neutral.” The de- 
scription of life, or “facticity”, obtains an overall hermeneutic 
character precisely in virtue of the insight that interpretation can- 
not be regarded as something added, as a kind of extension or 
annex, as it were, to some theoretically neutral (and allegedly 
“objective”) description of a state of affairs: rather, preliminary 
“interpretedness” is inherent in all kinds of description, in all 
kinds of seeing, saying, and experiencing.16 If there is no “pure” 
theory (for “theory” is a derivative mode of being or comport- 
ment of one particular being called human), there is no pure 
description. What this insight implies for an adequate description 
of life or facticity is that theoretical concepts, as well as the lan- 
guage theory speaks, should be abandoned in favor of a language 
growing out of everyday life and able to let things be seen in their 
interpretedness, that is, in exactly the way we encounter and 
have to do with them; a hammer, as has been said, is primarily 
encountered as a tool for pounding nails into the wall, rather 
than as a neutral thing out there having the property of weight.17 
This re-evaluation of interpretation implies that hermeneutics 
cannot remain a subordinate discipline of the human sciences, 
but becomes, as Heidegger explicitly states, “the self- 
interpretation of facticity.”18 It is important to see that this “self- 
interpretation of facticity” is not a kind of anthropology, simply a 
matter of our having to do with ourselves, implying that other 
beings of the world are left untouched. Insofar as humans are 
precisely the beings who describe the world in its entirety, her- 
15 GA 61: 89ff.; PIA 240. 
16 See GA 61: 86f.; PIA 241, 264; for later, see GA 20: 75/56, 190/140, 
416/300; SZ 169/213, 383/435. 
17 SZ 154ff./195ff. 
18 GA 63: 14. 
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meneutics gets linked to ontology – a major reason why in the title 
of the 1923 course “hermeneutics of facticity” and “ontology” 
occur together, clearly anticipating the correlation of fundamental 
ontology and existential analytic in Being and Time. 
Man’s fundamental mode of being, Heidegger claims in BT, is 
Being-in-the-world. One’s original relation to things emerging in 
his environment is one of using, handling, employing, arranging 
rather than “knowing” them. His practical way of having to do 
with things presupposes preliminary understanding of them, in 
particular, of what they are for. Understanding is not something 
to be attained first in science – be it natural or human – but rather 
vice versa: the knowing relation to the world is a derivative one. 
Heidegger shows in a series of analyses how, in virtue of what 
modifications of Being-in-the-world man’s knowing relation to 
the world springs – how, in order for a thing to become an object 
of knowledge or scientific research, our preliminary access to it, 
that is our way of having to do with it, must have undergone a 
specific modification. With regard to our hermeneutic problem- 
atic and the re-evaluation of the concept of understanding we 
may say: knowledge derives from understanding and not vice 
versa.
2.1. The Relevance of Husserl’s Phenomenology 
Heidegger’s use of hermeneutics for ontological purposes is 
hardly conceivable without his appropriation of phenomenology. 
In its turn, Husserlian phenomenology was open to a hermeneu- 
tic reinterpreation or radicalization from the very beginning. Let 
me sum up some of the basic characters that show this tendency: 
1) The proclamation of returning to “the things themselves” 
(e.g. in Husserl’s programatic Logos-essay).19 
2) The reconception of philosophy in terms of a “science of 
true beginnings, or origins,” a science that is “concemed with 
what is radical,” and therefore is “radical itself in its procedure.”20 
3) The ideal of a scientificity sui generis for philosophy; the 
insistence on a specifically philosophical, i.e. phenomenological 
19 „Philosophy as Rigorous Science,” in Husserl, Shorter Works, eds. P. 
McCormick, F. A. Elliston (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), 
pp. 176, 196. 
20 Ibid., p. 196. 
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method; the preference of description over construction; the 
emphasis laid on “experience”, “essence”, and “meaning”. 
4) The dismissal of the authorities, the quest for an “unprejud- 
iced”, “presuppositionless” research, and the urge to return to 
the original sources of intuition as the only legitimizing source for 
concepts in philosophy.21 
Heidegger’s radicalization of the innermost claims of phe- 
nomenology in his postwar lectures made phenomenology turn 
against Husserl. Against phenomenology in the name of phe- 
nomenology itself.22 Insights deriving from his intense confron- 
tation and hermeneutic reconception of phenomenology: 
1) The “thing itself,” if viewed “presuppositionless” enough, is 
not transcendental consciousness, but life or later being. 
2) Similarly, the “origin” or “source” in Husserl’s claim of 
philosophy as “science of true beginnings, or origins”, is not 
transcendental consciousness and its reflective acts. Rather, the 
origin is historical. The historical ego precedes the transcenden- 
tal. The transcendental ego emerges by virtue of a de- 
historization [Entgeschichtlichung] of the historical ego, sup- 
pressing its primordial, i.e. “original”, historicity. 
3) Husserl’s delimitation of the specific research field of phen- 
omenology itself (transcendental consciousness) is “un- 
phenomenological”, i.e. dogmatic, affected with metaphysical 
bias. It is carried out not so much by returning to “the things 
themselves”, to the true “origins” – as the maxim of phenomen- 
ology would require – as under the influence of a pre-conceived 
idea of what should constitute the business of philosophy. The 
Cartesian–Kantian orientation is traditionally and thus dogmatic- 
ally assumed rather than phenomenologically discussed and de- 
limited. While prohibiting the making of assertions about being, 
Husserl tacitly commits himself to certain ontological positions 
without thematizing the access to those positions phenome- 
nologically.23 
4) Husserl’s allegedly “pure” description is “theoretically” bi- 
ased. His “natural attitude” is not natural enough; it is indeed 
21 See, e.g., Husserl’s “principle of all principles” (Husserl, Ideen zu einer 
reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Husserliana 
III/l, ed. K. Schuhmann [The Hague: Nijhoff, 1976], § 24). 
22 See GA 58: 6, 145, 237. 
23 See Ideen, I, § 76; GA 20: 155ff., 178. 
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“artificial” or “theoretical”. The “experience” he conceptualizes 
is affected with “naturalism” – a view against which Husserl con- 
ceives himself as fighting as firmly as possible. In the “natural” 
attitude, Husserl tends to “experience” the reality in a naturalistic 
way. What is needed is an attempt to experience the intentional 
being more originally, i.e., in a more unprejudiced way, in its 
“natural” setting – something that precisely Being and Time will 
provide with the title of “existential analytic”. 
2.2. The coupling of Husserl and Dilthey 
Heidegger frequently spoke of Dilthey’s appreciation of 
Husserl; this may have prompted him to assume the task of 
uniting the impulses of both thinkers. His strategic move is, in 
this regard, a double one. His hermeneutic reshaping of phen- 
omenology draws on Dilthey precisely by shifting the accent from 
“consciousness” to “life”, and, while in approaching Dilthey’s 
theme, “life”, he employs phenomenological descriptive strat- 
egies, transforming it into a “hermeneutics of facticity”.(Roughly, 
the theme is provided by Dilthey, the method by Husserl.) By 
doing this, he thinks he is doing justice not only to Husserl’s in- 
nermost efforts in a more original and “unprejudiced” way than 
Husserl himself ever did, but, incidentally, also to Dilthey’s own. 
Heidegger interpreted Dilthey as having striven to get access to 
historical reality, historical life, rather than historical knowledge. 
Dilthey wanted to interpret life out of itself, but this tendency- 
deviated and indeed distorted by the wissenschaftstheoretisch 
climate of the age – ended up in an attempt at an epistemological 
foundation of the human studies. The suggestion is that Dilthey 
interpreted life not from itself, but from an epistemological, i.e. 
distanced, perspective – one major reason why Dilthey’s whole 
conceptuality was to undergo a hermeneutic purification. What 
mattered to Heidegger was access to historical being, rather than 
to historical knowledge with its alleged objectivity (and the differ- 
ence between transforming our historical knowledge and trans- 
forming our historical being is all too apparent). But Heidegger 
thinks this was also Dilthey’s original impulse before it became 
obscured and misunderstood by himself, undergoing as it did a 
considerable limitation. In any case, it was Dilthey’s program, as 
Heidegger understood it, that Heidegger brought to bear on 
Husserl’s phenomenology, that let him perceive its inadequacies, 
and, finally, transform it hermeneutically. He gave finally an 
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ontological reconception to both transcendental phenomenology 
and methodological (geisteswissenschaftlich) hermeneutics in his 
existential analytic. 
The hermeneutic transformation of Husserl’s phenomenology 
is inspired to a considerable extent by Heidegger’s effort to de- 
velop an original, “unprejudiced” approach to life. In the course 
of various devastating criticisms, Heidegger more often than not 
takes great pains to note that there is a positive and original im- 
pulse inherent in life-philosophy, that he indeed appreciates the 
impulse very much, while what he rejects is just its insufficient 
(because parasitic) realization.24 We should note that, when Hei- 
degger, for all his criticism, emphasizes the positive tendencies of 
life-philosophy the philosopher he most frequently has in mind is 
Dilthey.25 And we can hardly conceive of Heidegger’s historicist 
opposition to Husserl’s transcendental ego, the stress upon „das 
Historische” without Dilthey’s influence. Heidegger seems to 
suggest that the basic effort of life-philosophy is correct. He 
seems even to share the view of contemporary philosophy that 
the object primarily to be approached and investigated is “life”. 
But rather than developing conceptual means adequate to its 
ownmost object, “life”, life-philosophy relies upon the tools of 
the adversary for its own concepts, tends to borrow them from 
there. That is also the reason why, having realized that their 
tools are not equal to the task, life-philosophers tend to come 
inevitably to the conclusion that life, history, and existence are 
irrational. 
The point Heidegger makes could be put as follows: irration- 
alist philosophy is really too rational, for in claiming its objects to 
be irrational it uncritically borrows the measure or concept of 
rationality from the adversary rather than developing or elabo- 
rating a rationality or conceptuality of its own that conforms to its 
object. 
A good example of Heidegger’s modified outlook is that, by 
adopting a hermeneutic way of seeing, traditional empiricism can 
be shown to be insufficiently “empirical” – indeed, laden with dog- 
matic “theoretical” presuppositions. Understandably enough, if 
Heidegger turns back to “factical life”, he might be expected to 
heartily embrace empiricism – but the “experience” Heidegger has 
in mind is something entirely different from the concept of expe- 
rience applied in empirical philosophy. “Experience” is a key 
24 See GA 61: 82, 117; GA 9: 13f.; GA 63: 69, 108. 
25 See GA 63: 42; further GA 9: 13f.; GA 61: 7. 
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word of the young Heidegger, but, as he elucidates it at the very 
beginning, “experience is not understood here in a theoretical 
sense, as empiricist perceiving in contradistinction to something 
like rational thinking.26 What we perceive in the first place are, 
hermeneutically seen, by no means “sense data.” “What we »first« 
hear”, writes Heidegger in Being and Time, “is never noises or 
complexes of sounds, but the creaking wagon, the motor cycle. 
We hear the column on the march, the north wind, the wood- 
pecker tapping, the fire crackling.” And he adds significantly: “It 
requires a very artificial and complicated comportment [Einstel- 
lung] to ‘hear’ a ‘pure noise’.”27 In other words: to claim we first 
perceive a “pure noise” requires having changed comportment, 
having assumed a theoretical attitude. In like manner, what we 
do see in the first place is not something like colored surfaces, or, 
still less, „sense data”, but e.g. the professor’s chair, a ready-to- 
hand object in our surrounding world. What is immediately given 
is not acts of consciousness; an immediate, unprejudiced experi- 
encing knows of no acts of consciousness, sense data, pure 
sounds or noises, complexes of colors and surfaces, and the like. 
“Heidegger’s strikingly different conception of hermeneutics” 
may legitimately be seen to lie in the fact that “Heidegger’s 
analysis of Dasein as being-in-the-world changes our under- 
standing of understanding from a derivative phenomenon to 
the central feature, the keystone of human experience”.28 The 
case is not such that there is, first, something such as experience 
pure and simple, which gets interpreted in a second step. Every 
experience is always already interpreted – it is interpreted experi- 
ence. Experience is always already meaningful or meaning-laden. 
If there is a problem to be explained it is not how things come to 
assume meaning, but rather the other way round: how, by what 
modification of man’s being-in-the-world things become devoid of 
meaning. For humans are, as has been said, interpreting animals, 
and that through and through. 
**** 
26 GA 61: 91. 
27 SZ 164/207; see GA 20: 367/266. 
28 D. C. Hoy, “Heidegger and the Hermeneutic Turn,” p. 171 
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